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Relationship status? It’s complicated.
Heather Brook, Flinders University
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Nicola  Barker  Not  the Marrying Kind:  A Feminist  Critique of  Same-Sex Marriage,  Houndmills,
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Michael Cobb Single: Arguments for the Uncoupled, New York & London, New York University
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Not since the radical reforms to divorce enacted in the heady 1970s has there been so much huffing and puffing
and anxiety about the whole institution of marriage being blown down. At the centre of this anxiety is the
relationship of marriage and sexuality:  is  marriage (always,  necessarily,  naturally)  heterosexual?  Should it  be?
These questions are being debated not just in Australia, but in many places around the world; including, of
course, in the United States, where the Clinton administration’s Defence of Marriage Act of 1996 established
similar ends to the Howard Government’s  Marriage Act amendments of 2004: namely,  to limit marriage to
man/woman pairings (King 2007). Marriage has, for the most part, served heterosexuality (and its gendered
foundations)  in  ways that  normalise  and endorse  heterosexuality  as  ‘natural’.  At times marriage has  carried
heavily gendered weight, and arguably still does. (Does ‘wife’ mean the same thing as ‘husband’, and are both
these terms interchangeable with ‘spouse’, or do they all have different connotations?) The issue for many is
whether marriage should remain exclusively heterosexual, or whether marriage can and should be expanded to
include same-sex as  well  as  different-sex relationships.  As a  social  institution,  marriage is  entangled in  sex,
religion and politics, and as such can inspire heated controversy. The three books reviewed here address various
questions about marriage, relationships and politics.
SEX, POLITICS, RELIGION
In An Argument for Same-Sex Marriage Emily R. Gill brings mainstream American political science to the task. Gill
argues, with painstaking attention to detail, that sexuality is akin to religious orientation and that both should be
subject to similar treatment and protections. The mirror reflecting the likeness of sexual and religious orientation
is  the  US  constitution’s  First  Amendment.  Religious  freedom is  not  the  only  right  addressed  by  the  First
Amendment. The relevance of the amendment for Gill is that it prohibits any law that impedes the free exercise
of religion, and thus guarantees Americans the right to worship as they see fit. Gill’s starting point is the idea that
when governments endorse one religion at the expense of others, they effectively marginalise and exclude those
who follow a different religion. She contends that sexual and religious orientation are similar personal attributes
with similar articulations to citizenship. Church and state are (properly) separate but judgments must be made
about  whether  Christmas  decorations  in  the  public  arena  should  be  accommodated,  and  whether  other,
non-Christian decorations should be similarly permitted. Gill argues that such questions are generally subject to a
kind of ‘live and let live’ approach in which differences are respected, and that sexuality should be treated in the
same way. Marriage must be made available to same-sex and different-sex couples, and anything less amounts to
a denial of civic equality—that is, because marriage is implicated in a whole range of laws and policies, being
denied the right to marry results in gay and lesbian people being effectively excluded from full citizenship.
In the US context, Gill offers a thorough and well-researched argument. For those living outside the United
States, however—particularly in places where religious interests play a less pivotal role in public affairs—the
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book may be less useful. There is much for those interested in American society and politics to chew over,
particularly  for  students  of  political  theory:  Gill’s  touchstones  include  Will  Kymlicka,  Nancy Fraser,  Carole
Pateman and Evan Gerstmann (among others). Gill offers small-L liberal thinkers some very solid ground from
which to reason. The path she treads, however, is long and complicated, and its destination is probably one that
only  those  already  committed  to  similar  ideals  will  find  appealing.  For  those  of  us  less  enthralled  by  the
intricacies of religious freedom in the United States,  the argument—rigorous as it  is—seems insufficient  in
several respects.
The cynic in me wonders whether Gill’s  logic might,  in any case,  be wasted in a political environment that
is—sometimes even proudly—impervious to rational argument. Indeed, Gill’s argument is so tight that its shape
resembles a snow dome: a perfectly crafted and thoroughly attractive scene that exists only in its own, entirely
self-contained space. Gill may be right to suggest that sexuality and religion are comparable orientations, for
example,  but  avoids  thinking  through  the  implications  these  orientations  bring  to  how people  understand
themselves and others. Processes of religious and sexual orientation invoke our sense of self in direct but not
always rational ways. I am reminded of Helen Keane’s astute observation that ‘in love as in shoes, the sensible is
rarely the most appealing’ (2002, p. 139). I wonder whether the same might be true for sexual and religious
identities. If their appeal and operations are other than rational, Gill’s argument loses much of its traction.
I wonder, too, about precisely who Gill means to persuade. Moderate folks amenable to the idea of same-sex
marriage are unlikely to need complex political arguments to be convinced of the justice of equal marriage rights,
while those hetero-conservatives on the loonier edge of the Christian right are unlikely to walk with Gill beyond
the first step of the argument—if they even get that far. Advocates for the religious right are likely to reject the
idea that sexuality  and religion are at  all  similar,  let  alone that they should be subject to the same political
treatment.  Someone like Robert Knight,  for example,  (one of the drafters of the Defence of Marriage Act
mentioned earlier) would position sexuality and religion as polar opposites; with religious belief at the height of
human consciousness, full of faith and soul and praise, and sexual behaviour as the basest, most brute human
instinct. For Knight, marriage—heterosexual marriage—is the elevating framework that redeems sexual behaviour
and prevents  ‘moral  meltdown’ (Knight 2011).  Objections might also arise  in relation to choice:  do people
choose sexualities? Can one ‘convert’ from one sexual orientation to another, just as people convert from one
faith to another? Are atheism and asexuality similar in any meaningful way? Even if one accepts Gill’s premise
that there is some political likeness between the two, treating sexuality and religion as similar orientations doesn’t
necessarily  further  the  argument  for  same-sex  marriage.  For  homophobes,  gay  and lesbian  orientations  are
human sexualities only in the same way that Satanism might be said to be a religion. Perhaps the roots of civic
inequality around sexuality are more strongly informed by religious traditions than Gill suggests—making her
focus on civil marriage and civic equality at risk of redundancy. Perhaps, too, these limits speak to the overall
usefulness—or otherwise—of same-sex marriage as an avenue to broader equality.
WHY (NOT) MARRIAGE?
These limits are taken up and developed in Nicola Barker’s Not the Marrying Kind. Barker is a lecturer in Law
working in the United Kingdom, and her book is part of a series in socio-legal studies. Hers is, in my view, the
best of the three texts under review here, not least because she develops important, enduring, and well-informed
critiques of (heterosexual) marriage and considers these in the light of contemporary calls for marriage equality
and  rights.  Barker  argues  that  feminist  criticisms  of  marriage  aired  in  the  1970s  and  80s  have  continuing
relevance to the political interests of gay, lesbian, and other queer people, and are ignored at their peril. Indeed,
in Barker’s view, gay and lesbian marriage advocates’ failure to consider feminist arguments against marriage
constitutes a fatal flaw in their thinking. Historically, marriage has offered spouses (and especially husbands) a
range of privileges, protections and responsibilities—tax breaks, housing benefits, ‘next of kin’ decision-making,
and superannuation benefits, for example. Marriage has also worked as a kind of privacy screen, shielding the
exploitation and assault of spouses (usually wives) from scrutiny. Barker argues that such privileges are unfairly
attached to marriage, and operate to elevate only one kind of relationship (and sometimes only one partner to
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that relationship) at the expense of others. Why, for example, should elderly sisters who have lived together for
30 years and wish to bequeath their shared home to each other have to pay an inheritance tax they would avoid if
they  were  a  married  couple?  For  Barker,  broadening  the  scope  of  marriage  to  include  same-sex  couples
perpetuates its social elevation in ways that are inconsistent with a broader agenda of social justice in which rules
should apply to people in similar situations in similar ways, regardless of their relationship status. Barker’s vision
is  of  a  social  order  in  which  material  benefits  are  not  attached  to  spuriously  respectable,  state-sanctioned
monogamy, but instead exist in a range of diverse and meaningful forms.
One of the significant strengths of this book is its international scope. Unlike the other books reviewed here,
Barker considers marriage laws in jurisdictions beyond those most immediately relevant to herself, and this very
much enhances her discussion. Similarly enriching is Barker’s willingness to advance an unpopular view. At a time
when supporting same-sex marriage has come to symbolise sexual equality more generally, arguments pointing to
historical  and continuing problems with marriage’s institutional reign must  be put carefully.  And,  in Not the
Marrying Kind, they are. There are no straw houses, here: Barker counters different points of view respectfully and
rigorously. Her materials and scholarship are law-based, drawing on legislation, judgments, appeals, reports, and
jurisprudence informed by feminist and queer theory. There is, unavoidably perhaps, some legal jargon used, but
Barker nonetheless manages to maintain a more grounded, human perspective than Gill’s  snow dome does.
Barker  confidently  demonstrates  how a  critical  view of  marriage  might  be  consistent  with  gay  and lesbian
liberation and equality. Like those ancient ‘wise women’, Barker warns gay and lesbian marriage advocates to be
careful  what  they  wish for.  As a  legal  scholar,  Barker does  not  address  the  cultural  weight  of  marriage or
weddings  in  any  systematic  or  profound way.  When she  talks  about  the  ‘symbolic  recognition’  attached to
marriage, she gauges this from legal texts and testimony, not from cultural practices and artefacts (like weddings,
popular movies and television shows like The Bachelor). Perhaps this reduces her book’s breadth of appeal, but in
marriage scholarship, as in marriage itself, one can’t have everything.
ALONE AT LAST?
I wondered, pondering the title and cover image of Michael Cobb’s Single: Arguments for the Uncoupled, whether this
text might be usefully teamed with Barker’s and Gill’s as the art to their science. Cobb is a cultural theorist, a
literary  scholar  from Toronto  whose  book  forms  part  of  a  ‘sexual  cultures’  series.  As  an  interdisciplinary
academic, I am often intrigued by the way that different scholarly traditions speak, or fail to speak, to each other.
When I  saw that  Cobb’s  previous book is  entitled God Hates  Fags:  The  Rhetorics  of  Religious  Violence  (2006)  I
wondered how Emily Gill could have avoided considering it in her Argument. But then I read Single. And, if it is
anything like its predecessor, I can’t be surprised that Gill considered it outside her scope.
Single is a convoluted and unclear polemic, revolving around the idea that to be single is to live in a state of more
or less permanent resistance to social disparagement. Despite its cultural derogation, for Cobb, the single state
seems to bring with it quite literal visions (or delusions) of grandeur. This is a work of cultural studies, so its
objects, references, and frameworks are thoroughly interpretative. Cobb draws on sources as diverse as Beyonce,
Big Love and Bridget Jones, Morrisey, Freud, Virginia Woolf, and Lauren Berlant. Cobb’s argument is that singleness
is socially reviled, and that it is wrongly assumed that everyone who is single is also lonely. But is this a bold or
original idea? Is it really news that not everyone wants to be in a relationship? Is culture really saturated with
anxious coupling, and can the figure of the single really offer something more creative and beautiful?
Cobb’s starting point is that being intimately partnered is so central to most people’s lives that those who remain
single—whether by choice, accident, or otherwise—are pitied and loathed. The cultural importance attached to
being part of a love-pair is so grave as to be oppressive, creating fear that the partner-love that is supposed to last
forever may not last. People change, circumstances change, the beloved betrays, love sputters out. At the heart of
the experience of being coupled, for Cobb, are feelings of anxiety over anticipated loss. This ‘deathly’ fear—this
worry that the couple might be undone—is projected, according to Cobb, onto the figure of the single. In this
way, single people become feared, hated, ‘the avatar of the lonely crowd’ (p. 15, 22).
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In some ways, this is an interesting argument. It speaks, perhaps, to many people’s experience of moving from
singleness to coupledom and back again. But the idea that being single is decried, derogated, and impermissible
seems to me to be at best only partly true. It is certainly gendered: the first cultural products Cobb introduces are
the Sex and the City series, the Bridget Jones books and movies, and Beyonce’s ‘All the Single Ladies’. These are
heavily feminised products, but gender and sexualities do not figure in any sustained way in Cobb’s book. Nor
does he consider other embodied differences, even when these can be seen to have a very different relation to
singleness than the literary and cultural forms he interprets. Disabled people and their partners, for example, are
likely to be subject to all sorts of pitying social responses—because they are coupled—and are almost never the
subject of popular cultural representations of coupledom (Rozengarten 2014). Cobb’s query ‘How many movies
have you gone to recently where a single person has been featured, happily, strongly, without any kind of lurking
sadness or loss?’ (Ledger 2012) is thus somewhat disingenuous. After all, action heroes are nearly always ‘single’
(Morrison & Halton 2009). They are admired and loved in their singularity. If they are imperfect, their flaws do
not inhere in their singleness. Can we even imagine Mrs James Bond? Mrs Rambo? In contrast, the heroines of
(heteronormative, mainstream) romantic comedy are typically inadequate or excessive as single people, but their
‘soul-mate’  is  almost  always  idealised:  indeed,  part  of  his  ‘perfection’  is  invested  in  his  (thrillingly,  perhaps
temporary) singleness. Single men and single women are treated—in the movies as in life—quite differently, and
in avoiding dealing with this, Cobb’s argument is muddied.
I take Cobb’s point that it is too often assumed that most people want to be coupled. However, the assumption
may not be so unfair: perhaps most people do want to be coupled. Is that really such a dangerous or oppressive
thing? Perhaps many of us too readily interpret single people as pre-coupled or post-coupled rather than simply,
happily single. What I am less sure about is the impact of this assumption. Being partnered does not necessarily
mean having to negotiate (or displace) anxiety about loss—at least, no more than simply caring about any other
person means having to consider and experience loss.
Cobb writes in a self-consciously idiosyncratic style (p. 33). The couple is, for example ‘steely’ (p. 26, p. 30, and
elsewhere), and Cobb says, at one point, ‘families terrify me’ (p. 70) even as he opens the book with a somewhat
cheesy anecdote concerning his much-loved ‘grandma Jewell’. There are epigraphs by Baudelaire (in French, with
English  translation)  and  Roland  Barthes,  Emily  Dickinson  and  William Faulkner.  It  is  eclectically,  densely,
abstract  and  ‘chatty’  in  turn.  Ultimately,  I  cannot  quite  fathom  Single.  Too  much  of  what  Cobb  says  is
contradictory,  or  at  least  inconsistent.  For  example,  he  says,  parenthetically,  as  if  to  underline  his  own
insouciance, ‘one doesn’t have to be single literally to have the sensations of the single life’ (p. 38). But what does
it mean, then, to be literally single? If someone who is married nevertheless dines out alone, or attends social
occasions without a partner, are they having ‘the sensations of the single life’, or of being partnered? What of
couples who live apart—in different homes, cities, or countries? Are they single or coupled? Consider, say, the
85-year old woman living alone, widowed at the death of her husband of 60 years, who lives with the objects and
effects of their shared life, and who speaks to her dead husband every day: is such a woman really ‘single’? If we
extend this formulation, hardly anyone could be said to be single in any but the most fleeting way. If this is
Cobb’s point—that we persist in drawing out peoples’ connections to each other, when we could profitably
reimagine being human in more singular or atomised ways—I’m not convinced that he offers anything more
than a risky endorsement of bald neo-liberal individualism. Cobb acknowledges early in the book that being
single is not the same as being lonely. I have no quibble with him on this: being single is certainly not of a piece
with being unhappy, nor even merely alone. But I wonder if, more often than not, Cobb is not challenging the
centrality of couple-stories and their effects so much as championing the pleasures and potential of aloneness. If
he is, I endorse his effort, and join him in celebrating solitude and its undervalued gifts, even if I wish he could
have made his point clearer.
LOVED UP FUTURES?
Although each of these books approaches the topic of marriage and its alternatives in very different ways, they
by no means cover every aspect of what is now a prolific debate. The religious aspects of marriage, for example,
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are omitted almost entirely: marriage is considered only as a civil institution, (even by Gill). Each author figures
marriage and the people involved in it in different ways. For Emily Gill, marriage is a fundamental ‘good’ that
intersects with identity, sexuality and the state in meaningful ways, and remains a privileged civil institution with
couples at its core. Michael Cobb contests not just the privileged place that marriage occupies, but also the
cultural domination of couple-stories. His is an effort to recuperate what he sees as the maligned and despised
figure of the single. Cobb’s ‘single’ stands in direct confrontation with the norm of coupledom, yet does not
(exactly)  criticise  marriage  as  such.  Rather,  Cobb’s  target  is  the  desire  for  a  shared-paired  life.  I  am not  as
convinced as Cobb that the line dividing couples and singles is always so clear, let alone that its effect is always to
devalue singles. My view is more consistent with Barker’s, which is peopled not by single individuals, but by
people in various degrees of relatedness.
Writing about singleness in contrast to coupledom redraws the line that divides them, when in fact that division
is  anything but  straightforward.  While  I  would  not  suggest  for  a  second that  people—regardless  of  sexual
orientation—ought  or  ought  not  to  marry,  I  am all  for  more  love,  for  love  that  is  respected  in  its  many
incarnations, and for love that is mutually rewarding for those who find it, wherever they find it. Whether such
love is more likely to be found in marriage, outside it, or even in singleness, is anyone’s guess.
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